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Abstract. This article seeks to provide an understanding of 
the historic success of the Saskatchewan Party and the his-
toric failure of the NDP in the 2011 Saskatchewan provincial 
election.  Drawing on telephone survey data from the 2011 
Saskatchewan Election Study, we argue that leadership, 
partisan loyalty, and issue salience best explain the Sas-
katchewan Party’s dominance over the NDP. On election 
day, the Saskatchewan Party benefitted from the carefully 
cultivated popularity of Brad Wall, the development of a 
loyal base of voters who believed in the party’s vision of a 
‘New Saskatchewan’, and the confidence of the electorate 
with the party’s handling of key issues.  The NDP’s loss of 
seats and the drop in its popular vote can be attributed to the 
unpopularity of the party’s leader, its overreliance on a rela-
tively small base of party loyalists, and its inability to con-
nect with voters on issues that were of most importance to 
them. 
 
Keywords. Saskatchewan, elections, Saskatchewan Party, 
New Democratic Party. 
 
 
Résumé. Cet article cherche à comprendre le succès histo-
rique du Parti saskatchewanais (PS) et l’échec historique du 
Nouveau Parti démocratique (NPD) lors de l’élection provin-
ciale de la Saskatchewan de 2011. En utilisant les données de 
questionnaires téléphoniques effectués dans le cadre de 
l’Étude électorale de la Saskatchewan de 2011, nous avan-
çons que le leadeurship, la loyauté partisane, et l’attention 
portée sur une question expliquent le mieux la domination 
du PS sur le NPD. Le jour de l’élection, le SP a bénéficié 
d’une popularité de Brad Wall cultivée avec soin, le dévelop-
pement d’une base loyale de votants qui ont adhéré à la 
vision du parti d’une « Nouvelle Saskatchewan », et la con-
fiance de l’électorat dans la manière dont le parti abordait les 
questions clef. La perte de sièges pour le NPD et la baisse de 
son vote populaire peuvent être attribuées à l’impopularité 
du chef du parti, sa dépendance d’une base relativement 
faible de personnes loyales au parti, et son incapacité à éta-
blir un lien avec les votants sur des questions prioritaires 
pour eux. 
 
Mots clefs. Saskatchewan, élections, Parti saskatchewanais, 
Nouveau Parti démocratique. 
 
 
On November 7, 2011, the ground of Saskatchewan politics 
appeared to shift. Saskatchewan is “widely viewed as the 
cradle of Canadian social democracy” (Wesley, 2011: 1) and 
the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) and its 
successor, the New Democratic Party (NDP), had held power 
for just over 47 years between 1944 and 2010. With election 
victories more numerous than setbacks, the CCF-NDP al-
ways followed the occasional electoral defeat by bouncing 
back in the next election with spirited effort that came close 
to bringing down the incumbent government; indeed, the 
NDP’s comebacks in the 1967 and 1986 elections signalled 
the ‘beginning of the end’ for Thatcher and Devine govern-
ments, respectively.  
However, the 2011 provincial election did not follow this 
pattern.  Instead of living up to its moniker as Saskatche-
wan’s “natural governing party” (Wesley, 2011: 3), the NDP 
lost 5% of its popular vote and dropped 11 seats, including 
that of its leader. After four years in power, the centre-right 
Saskatchewan Party increased its popular vote from 51% to 
64%, an unprecedented level of electoral support in Sas-
katchewan politics. It captured every seat in the provincial 
legislature lost by the NDP.  Saskatchewan has suddenly 
become a remarkably uncompetitive two party system domi-
nated by a conservative, rather than social democratic, polit-
ical party.   
In this article, we explore a mix of qualitative and quanti-
tative data to explain this apparent shift in Saskatchewan 
politics. We show how leadership evaluations, partisan loyal-
ty, and issue salience led to the historic success of the Sas-
katchewan Party and the unprecedented failure of the NDP 
in the 2011 Saskatchewan provincial election. We begin with 
an analysis of the Saskatchewan Party’s first term in office 
and of the election campaign, arguing that the party’s in-
vestments in the brand of its popular leader, Brad Wall, and 
its image of a cautious, centrist government resonated with 
the electorate, while the NDP’s selection of an unpopular 
leader (Dwain Lingenfelter) and its campaign promises to 
expand costly programs failed to attract a broad electoral 
2	   Canadian Political Science Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2013, 1-12	  
base. The analyses of previous Saskatchewan provincial 
elections have been generally qualitative in nature and have 
never involved a survey of voters to establish the basic dy-
namics of electoral behaviour.1  For the first time, we are able 
to support a qualitative assessment of a Saskatchewan pro-
vincial election with a statistical analysis of vote choice to 
deepen our understanding of Saskatchewan politics. Draw-
ing on original data from the 2011 Saskatchewan Election 
Study (SKES), we show that the Saskatchewan Party’s victo-
ry was attributable primarily to the popularity of Brad Wall, 
which was reinforced by a strong base of party loyalists and 
the electorate’s confidence in the party on the issues that it 
held to be important, such as maintaining economic growth 
and improving health care. We also show that the NDP’s 
historic loss was attributable to the unpopularity of its leader 
and the low salience of its policy issues; indeed, the NDP 
ended up having to motivate its small base of party loyalists 
(roughly 20% of the electorate) just to maintain a foothold in 
the legislature.   
 
Sowing the Seeds of Success and Failure: 
Saskatchewan Politics Prior to the Election 
 
Over the past decade, the primary debate in academic re-
search concerning the Saskatchewan party system has fo-
cused on the extent to which the two major parties in the 
province have moved away from a left-right polarization 
towards a convergence at the ideological centre (Wishlow, 
2001; Leeson, 2008; Blake, 2008; Rayner and Beaudry-
Mellor, 2009).   While there were some philosophical differ-
ences between the Saskatchewan Party and the NDP in the 
2007 provincial election, analyses of the parties’ platforms 
by McGrane (2008) and Leeson (2008) conclude that both 
parties generally hugged the political centre during the cam-
paign.  
Once in power, the Saskatchewan Party continued its ef-
forts to portray its policies as moderate and balanced. After 
the Saskatchewan Party’s 2003 electoral defeat, it strove to 
brand itself as a “party of the centre” (Blake, 2008: 168), and 
this message of moderation continued into its first governing 
mandate (Béland, 2011). The Wall government avoided 
controversial policy initiatives on social conservative issues 
such as abortion or gay rights;2 was careful to privatize only 
the out-of-province assets of Crown Corporations and to use 
private health care providers only to reduce surgical waiting 
lists; steered clear of a potential controversy by backing away 
from plans to build a nuclear reactor in the province; and 
resisted pressures to invest public money in a new domed 
stadium in Regina. The government did not introduce major 
tax cuts for business, centered its tax reduction strategy on 
raising the personal income tax exemptions to remove low-
income individuals from the province’s tax rolls (McGrane, 
2011), and invested in the province’s child welfare system. 
This latter step embodied a ‘compassionate conservatism’ 
that seeks to provide better opportunities for the ‘deserving 
poor’ rather than an expansion of general entitlements. 
Finally, the Wall government succeeded in convincing the 
federal government to block BHP Billiton’s attempted hostile 
takeover of the Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan – a 
move that clearly resonated with the Saskatchewan public. 
While the Saskatchewan Party government did not com-
pletely avoid ideological politics – as evidenced by its labour 
legislation and its decision to back away from greenhouse 
gas emission commitments made by the previous NDP gov-
ernment (Wood, 2009) – these moves were made early in its 
mandate, and the controversy they occasioned had dissipat-
ed before the election. Overall, the Saskatchewan Party ran a 
cautious, centrist, and fiscally responsible government dur-
ing its first mandate.  
It is also important to note the strength on the Saskatch-
ewan economy during the 2007-11 period, even in the face of 
the 2008-9 global economic recession. The economy was a 
highly salient issue for Saskatchewan residents (Praxis Ana-
lytics, 2011) during this period, and the Saskatchewan Party 
positioned itself as having contributed to the province’s 
economic success. Furthermore, the Saskatchewan Party 
entered the election with a record of sound governance: 
there were no serious allegations of corruption or dishones-
ty, and the Wall government used robust natural resource 
revenues to increase spending in a variety of areas while 
reducing government debt (McGrane, 2011: 99). While the 
government faced a budgetary crunch in 2010, due to signif-
icantly over-estimated potash revenues (Saskatchewan De-
partment of Finance, 2010: 69), it limited spending increas-
es and used money from its Growth and Financial Security 
Fund to avoid a deficit. Based on this combination of ideo-
logical centrism and strong economic growth, the Saskatch-
ewan Party solidified its grip on power to the point that the 
party seemed almost invincible going into the 2011 election.  
While the Saskatchewan Party cultivated future voters 
following its 2007 victory, the NDP struggled. Led by former 
Premier Lorne Calvert, the party caucus had a difficult time 
mounting a sustained attack against a government that was 
more centrist than most people expected (Mandryk, 2008). 
While the retirement of Calvert in October 2008 presented 
an opportunity for the party to redefine itself, the leadership 
race was dominated by traditional social democratic ideas 
such as expanded public ownership and new universal social 
programs. Dwain Lingenfelter, a well-known cabinet minis-
ter from the NDP’s Romanow era (1991-2000), won the 
leadership despite damaging allegations of membership 
fraud. In spite of the political and private sector experience 
(in the Alberta oil patch) that he brought to the position, the 
NDP continued to struggle to present a consistent image and 
coherent vision to the Saskatchewan public. Initially, Lin-
genfelter’s NDP took a right-of-centre tack, accusing the 
Saskatchewan Party of overspending, only to abandon this 
approach for a more left-wing agenda that emphasized 
greater resource royalties, rent control, and the public own-
ership of potash. Further, the NDP took an aggressively 
negative tone, with Lingenfelter attacking Premier Wall 
directly as the “little thief from Swift Current” and a “loser,” 
while neglecting to make concerted attempts to appeal to 
supporters outside of its electoral base in Saskatchewan’s 
inner cities. Although public opinion data are limited,3 the 
available data confirm that the NDP’s fortunes did not im-
prove during Lingenfelter’s time at the helm of the party 
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(Insightrix Research, 2009; Mandryk, 2009), and Lingen-
felter himself proved to be a deeply unpopular leader (In-
sightrix Research, 2011; Cooper, 2011).  
Due to the fixed election date, the timing of the election 
had been known for over four years. The short 28-day cam-
paign officially began October 10th, 2011 and ended Novem-
ber 7th, 2011, but prior to the start of the election campaign 
the Saskatchewan Party launched a two-pronged political 
marketing strategy. First, the party invested in the ‘Wall 
Brand’ through advertisements featuring the Premier speak-
ing directly to Saskatchewan voters; these ads touted the 
province’s economic success and population growth, appeal-
ing to voters’ sense of pride and identity. Second, the party 
attacked the ‘Lingenfelter Brand’ with advertisements that 
emphasized Lingenfelter’s negative tone and asserted that he 
“didn’t come back from Alberta for you”.  With considerably 
fewer fiscal resources (in 2008-2011, the Saskatchewan 
Party out-fundraised the NDP by over two to one),4 the NDP 
appeared unable to respond, thus allowing their opponents 
to define their leader. 
 
Cultivating Victory with Potash: Campaign 
Dynamics 
 
While Saskatchewan’s parties had been converging towards 
the centre in recent decades, the 2011 Saskatchewan provin-
cial election provided a surprising clear ideological choice.  
The Saskatchewan Party touted its record of population and 
economic growth, promised to keep business and individual 
taxes at essentially the current level, and proposed an aus-
tere program of very small and targeted spending initiatives 
and tax credits totalling only $413 million over four years 
(Saskatchewan Party, 2011a). For its part, the NDP claimed 
that it could finance a large number of new social programs 
and tax reductions totalling $2.7 billion over four years 
without going into deficit by increasing taxes on natural 
resource (particularly potash) companies (NDP, 2011). The 
two parties also differed in tone: the Saskatchewan Party ran 
a more negative campaign, attacking Lingenfelter personally 
and warning that electing the NDP would endanger the 
province’s economic boom and risk moving Saskatchewan 
‘backwards’ into deficit (Fong, 2011). The NDP refrained 
from directly attacking Wall or the Saskatchewan Party, 
preferring to release advertisements emphasizing the “posi-
tive change” its policies would bring to families, and insist-
ing that everyone should benefit from the province’s eco-
nomic boom (Mandryk, 2011a).  As in previous Saskatche-
wan elections, business groups and unions did not stay on 
the sidelines: the Saskatchewan Chamber of Commerce 
reinforced the Saskatchewan Party’s message through an 
advertising campaign that argued that the province was “on 
track”, while unions sought to aid the NDP by running ad-
vertising attacking the Wall government and asking voters to 
“imagine” what could be done with higher resources royal-
ties (Benjoe, 2011).   
The basic narratives of the two parties began to be con-
structed during the first week of the campaign as both par-
ties made numerous policy announcements. Premier Wall 
opened his campaign by claiming that if the election was to 
be “a bidding war for the support of the votes of the people 
of this province, we’re not participating” (Hutton, 2011a).  
He followed through on this commitment by making several 
low-cost promises aimed at seniors and families in suburban 
ridings that the party lost narrowly to the NDP in 2007. Wall 
contrasted this “affordable” plan with an NDP spending 
spree that would mean “going back to 1980s-style budget 
deficit” (Cowan, 2011).  During his campaign kickoff Lingen-
felter stressed that his party’s campaign would be one of 
“ideas” aimed at “getting a bit more from our potash”, im-
proving health care, education, and increasing access to 
affordable housing (Hutton, 2011a). Of particular im-
portance was the NDP’s controversial proposal to negotiate a 
resource revenue sharing arrangement with Saskatchewan 
First Nations bands (Hutton, 2011b). The proposal generat-
ed debate throughout the campaign with fervent arguments 
made on both sides of the question (Green, 2011; Newman, 
2011).  
The second week of the campaign was again dominated 
by policy announcements as both parties released their 
platforms. Although the Saskatchewan Party was knocked 
slightly off message when one of its MLAs compared the 
NDP’s proposed First Nations revenue sharing agreement to 
handouts that “can be often used for alcohol or drugs” (Cha-
bun, 2011), the party recovered by the end of the week when 
Wall presented the party’s platform at a large rally in Saska-
toon. Structured around the slogan of “Moving Saskatche-
wan Forward”, the 47-page platform highlighted the Sas-
katchewan Party’s accomplishments during its first term in 
office and summarized the party’s “affordable” promises 
targeted at families, seniors, and students (Saskatchewan 
Party, 2011a). For its part, the NDP continued its ‘chicken in 
every pot’ strategy during the second week of the campaign. 
On October 20th, Tommy Douglas Day, the NDP released its 
platform in Regina, promising $2.3 billion in new spending 
over four years as well as $500 million in tax credits and 
rebates, with plans to fund these expansions through in-
creased potash royalties (NDP, 2011).  The NDP’s platform 
included a dental program for all school-aged children, 100 
new primary health facilities, a $216 million investment in 
affordable housing units, a tuition freeze, and a cap on child-
care fees. At the end of the week, Lingenfelter pledged to the 
Saskatchewan Federation of Labour convention that a NDP 
government would repeal the Wall government’s changes to 
labour laws that “interferes with the right of people to organ-
ize and have a union” (Hall, 2011a). 
The parties basically stayed on message during the third 
week of the campaign. Wall continued to hammer away at 
the NDP’s “unaffordable” platform that “would plunge Sas-
katchewan back into massive deficits” while announcing no 
new spending promises (Saskatchewan Party, 2011b), while 
the NDP made a variety of new expensive commitments 
(Hall, 2011c; Warwick and French, 2011; Pacholik and Cou-
ture, 2011). The primary event of the week was a 55-minute 
“bland” televised leader’s debate in which both leaders kept 
to their main messages and were not overly argumentative 
with each other (Hall and Couture, 2011). The general con-
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sensus was that the debate lacked a clear winner (Mandryk, 
2011b), a situation that has been found to generally benefit 
incumbent parties (Blais and Perrella, 2008). Following the 
debate, the Saskatchewan Party drew criticism from groups 
in the education sector when it announced its plan to delay 
the start of the school year until after the Labour Day week-
end (Hutton, 2011c). Further, reacting to the profitable 
Potash Corp third quarter earnings report, Lingenfelter 
criticized the CEO’s compensation package and called for 
higher potash royalties to pay for better social programs 
(Hutton and Warick, 2011), drawing rebuttals from both 
Premier Wall and the CEO of Potash Corp (Doyle, 2011). 
While both of these episodes generated discussion, they did 
not change the overall tenor of the campaign. Indeed, near 
the end of the third week, the first public poll of the cam-
paign was released showing the Saskatchewan Party with a 
commanding lead of 66% among decided and leaning voters 
with the NDP at 30%, the Green Party at 3%, and the Liber-
als at 1% (Forum Research, 2011). 
The final week of the campaign was uneventful. With few 
exceptions, the Saskatchewan Party avoided policy discus-
sions, and instead the Premier campaigned in ridings seen as 
NDP strongholds (Saskatchewan Party, 2011b). Wall was 
attacked by labour leaders over a statement that seemed to 
support union members opting out of paying union dues 
(Wall later clarified that he meant that he would be open to 
unions collecting dues instead of their employers) (Hall, 
2011b). Wall’s earlier refusal to consider the NDP’s idea of 
sharing resource revenues with Aboriginal bands induced a 
Chief of a prominent First Nation to call for the creation of 
an Aboriginal political party in the next provincial election 
(Warick, 2011a).  For its part, the NDP made additional 
spending promises and unveiled an on-line calculator to 
illustrate how much the party’s promises would save indi-
vidual voters and benefit their families (Couture and Hall, 
2011).  In the final days of the campaign, the party brought 
popular federal NDP politician Olivia Chow to Saskatchewan 
to criticize Wall for caring more about protecting the profits 
of potash companies and the exorbitant salaries of their 
CEOs than improving the lives of average citizens (Warick, 
2011b).   
 
Reaping the Rewards: A Historic Landslide 
for the Saskatchewan Party  
 
The four public opinion polls5 taken during the election 
period proved to be quite accurate: all four placed the Sas-
katchewan Party between 60% and 66% of the popular vote 
and while one Insightrix poll had the NDP as low as 26%, the 
other three polls correctly placed the party’s support be-
tween 30% and 34%. Since the final result mirrored what 
public polling had been indicating since 2009, it seems 
unlikely that the election campaign moved large blocks of 
voters. 
 





As O’Fee (2008) notes, Saskatchewan has generally featured 
a two party system and Saskatchewan politics has been 
increasingly drifting in this direction since the Progressive 
Conservatives merged with a group of dissent Liberal MLAs 
to form the Saskatchewan Party in 1997.  The 2011 election 
results suggest the completion of Saskatchewan’s movement 
back to a two party system.  However, it is a two party sys-
tem that is less competitive than in the past. While there are 
numerous examples of provincial parties in Canada receiving 
over 60% of the popular vote (Siaroff, 2009: 79), the Sas-
katchewan Party’s 64% of the popular vote in the 2011 elec-
tion was unprecedented in the history of Saskatchewan. The 
previous high was 57% by the Liberals in 1912. Further, the 
NDP’s popular vote was lowest that the party had received 
since the 1938 election. As such, what is most striking about 
the 2011 election was the large 32% gap in popular vote 
between the NDP and the Saskatchewan Party. Since 1944, 
the gap between the first place and second place party in 
Saskatchewan’s elections has averaged only 10%.   
The large gap between Saskatchewan’s two main parties 
seems to be attributable to two trends: the Saskatchewan 
Party’s growing strength in urban areas and the reduction of 
vote-splitting among right-wing parties. As O’Fee argues, 
Saskatchewan’s electorate has frequently been “divided on a 
rural/urban basis, with the two main opposing parties re-
flecting the social and political outlooks of urban and rural 
Saskatchewan” (2008: 195). The 2011 election saw a dra-
matic reduction of the rural/urban divide as the Saskatche-
wan Party supplemented their rural dominance with large 
majorities in many of Saskatchewan’s urban seats. Even 
some of the NDP’s strongholds in the central parts of Saska-
toon and Regina fell to the Saskatchewan Party.  At the same 
time as the Saskatchewan Party was making inroads into 
urban Saskatchewan, the Liberals’ share of the popular vote 
steadily declined and they failed to win seats in both the 
2003 and 2007 election. The results of the 2011 election 
signal either the death of the Saskatchewan Liberal Party or 
deep hibernation. The party managed to run only nine can-
didates and concentrated all of their limited resources on 
their leader’s seat where he finished a distant third.  The 
Saskatchewan CCF-NDP has traditionally benefitted from 
the vote splitting of parties to its right; the demise of the 
Liberals means that all of the right-of-centre voters have 
now coalesced behind the Saskatchewan Party.  
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Leaders, Loyalties, and Salient Issues: Ex-
plaining Vote Choice  
 
While issues and leadership appeared to be important fac-
tors in our qualitative assessment of the election campaign, 
their relative importance to the election outcome can be 
more fully appreciated by examining survey data. The 2011 
Saskatchewan Election Study (SKES) was a post-election 
telephone survey of 1,099 Saskatchewan residents. 6  Our 
analysis of this survey focuses exclusively on the vote choice 
between the Saskatchewan Party and the NDP. Although the 
Green Party ran a full slate of candidates, and other parties 
contested the election in some ridings, the Saskatchewan 
Party and the NDP garnered a combined 96 percent of the 
popular vote. Thus, we rely on binary logit estimation to 
assess the unique impacts of numerous possible determi-
nants of vote choice.  
To what extent did issues affect vote choice in the 2011 
Saskatchewan election?  Two types of issues are discussed 
during campaigns (Stokes, 1963; Clarke et al., 2009): posi-
tional issues, which divide both parties and voters into 
groups that are for or against certain policy stances (for 
example, same-sex marriage, abortion, and free trade); and 
valence issues, which unite nearly all voters and parties be-
hind a shared desire for the same outcome (for example, 
economic growth, reducing crime, and improving health 
care) (Stokes, 1963). Valence issues feature prominently in 
Canadian elections (Clarke et al., 2009), with parties pre-
senting different proposals for how to reach the same de-
sired outcome.  
The key positional issue in the 2011 Saskatchewan elec-
tion campaign was resource royalties, and the SKES data 
indicate that voters clearly favoured the Saskatchewan Par-
ty’s position rather than the NDP’s position. 7  The most 
prominent valence issue in the 2011 Saskatchewan election 
was the economy; as noted earlier, the Saskatchewan Party 
sought to capitalize on the province’s strong economic per-
formance during its first term – an appropriate strategy 
given that comparative research demonstrates that citizens 
are more likely to vote for governing parties when economic 
conditions are improving (Lewis-Beck, 1988; Anderson, 
2010). The SKES demonstrates the public’s overwhelmingly 
positive perception of the Saskatchewan economy,8 again 
suggesting an advantage for the Saskatchewan Party.  
But while the economy and resource royalties were 
prominent during the campaign, they were not necessarily 
meaningful in determining vote choice. The impact of issues 
on vote choice depends on at least two factors: the degree of 
personal salience voters attach to an issue and the ability of 
voters to link an issue to a party (Krosnick, 1990; Fournier et 
al., 2003). In order to gauge which kinds of issues were most 
salient, and which parties Saskatchewan voters favoured on 
those issues, the SKES asked respondents “what was the 
most important issue to you personally in the recent provin-
cial election?” and “which party was closest to you on this 
issue?” The responses to these questions, reported in table 2, 
show that two valence issues, the economy and health care, 
were the most important in the minds of voters, and on both 
issues, voters favoured the Saskatchewan Party. Further, a 
number of voters were concerned with two issues that were 
key to the Saskatchewan Party’s message, namely defi-
cits/debt and continuing to ‘move’ the province forward. 
Issues areas raised by the NDP, such as natural resources, 
education, and housing/rent control, were not very promi-
nent in the minds of voters, and those who cared deeply 
about natural resources, the issue that the NDP stressed the 
most during the campaign, did not favour the party’s posi-
tion.  
 




Voters’ evaluations of party leaders can also be a crucial 
determinant of electoral choice, particularly in elections 
where valence issues dominate. Leaders are the focal points 
of most modern, media-driven election campaigns (Bean 
and Mughan, 1989; Mendelsohn, 1994). But the emphasis on 
leadership does not mean that election campaigns are mere 
popularity contests; evaluations of leader characteristics are 
important cognitive shortcuts that voters may employ to 
choose parties, particularly under conditions of uncertainty, 
or in the absence of other relevant information (Lupia and 
McCubbins, 1998). In contexts where valence issues are 
prominent, leader characteristics are especially relevant, 
since voters are most concerned with the ability of leaders to 
deal effectively with those issues, rather than with the pre-
cise policy positions of the parties (Clarke et al., 2009).  
Nowhere was the gap between the Saskatchewan Party 
and the NDP larger than when it came to leader evaluations. 
The SKES asked respondents to gauge how they felt about 
each leader on a 100-point scale, where zero meant that the 
respondent “really disliked” and 100 meant the respondent 
“really liked” the leader. Brad Wall received a mean score of 
70 from voters, whereas Dwain Lingenfelter received a mean 
score of only 29. When compared to leader ratings in Cana-
dian federal elections, the 41-point rating difference between 
Wall and Lingenfelter is striking. In 2004 and 2000, mean 
federal leader ratings outside Quebec differed by four and 
three points, respectively (Clarke et al., 2009; Blais et al., 
2002). In 1997, the maximum difference was 10 points out-
side Quebec (Nevitte et al., 2000). Indeed, even those who 
voted for the NDP were not enamored with Lingenfelter. In 
fact, Wall’s mean score of 45 from NDP voters in the SKES 
was slightly higher than Lingenfelter’s mean score of 44 
from those same voters. A full 58% of NDP voters rated 
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Lingenfelter between 0-50, which means these voters sup-
ported the party despite their reservations about its leader, 
and only 11% of NDP voters rated Lingenfelter over 75.  
Issues and leaders are short-term factors that can vary 
considerably from election to election. Two other sets of 
factors, political identities (party and ideological identifica-
tions) and socio-demographic characteristics, are typically 
viewed as long-term determinants of vote choice, and should 
also be taken into consideration. The prominent role of party 
identification in structuring electoral choices is well-
documented: those who identify with a party are considera-
bly more likely to vote for that party (Campbell et al., 1960; 
Bélanger and Stephenson, 2010).  
Despite the fact that the Saskatchewan Party is a young 
party that is made up of a coalition of former Liberals and 
Progressive Conservatives, Saskatchewan Party identifica-
tion exploded in a relatively short period of time. In the 
2003 election, 20% of the Saskatchewan electorate identified 
with the Saskatchewan Party.9 By the 2011 election, SKES 
data reveals 41% identified with the party.  During the same 
time period, NDP partisanship dropped from 30% to 20% 
while Liberal partisanship fell from 17% to 7%. Further, 2011 
SKES data reveal that the intensity of the Saskatchewan 
Party’s partisans is relatively similar to the intensity of NDP 
partisans and much higher than the intensity of the small 
number of Liberal partisans within the Saskatchewan elec-
torate.10  
Ideological self-identification has received less attention 
in Canada than elsewhere, as significant numbers of Canadi-
ans report that they do not use the labels “left” and “right” 
when they think about politics and find them confusing 
(Gidengil et al., 2012: 38-39). However, the impact of ideo-
logical self-identification in political systems outside Canada 
(Fuchs and Klingemann, 1989; Dalton, 2010) suggests that 
ideology merits consideration in an analysis of Saskatchewan 
provincial politics. The SKES finds that 38 percent of Sas-
katchewan respondents place themselves on the right of the 
political spectrum, 34 percent see themselves as centrists, 16 
percent place themselves on the left, and 13 percent either 
did not know or refused to answer.11 Similar to party identi-
fication, if ideological self-placement mattered in the 2011 
election, there are good reasons to think it favoured the 
centre-right Saskatchewan Party. 
Finally, although the extent to which social background 
characteristics affect electoral support in Canada has been a 
source of some debate, voters with similar social back-
grounds may share electoral preferences because they often 
interact within the same social networks and share similar 
political interests (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944; Berelson et al., 
1954). The Canadian evidence is rather modest when it 
comes to the impact of social background characteristics on 
vote choice in specific elections, but they do seem to account 
for longer-term trends in party support (Johnston et al., 
1992). A variety of social background differences are taken 
into account in order to measure the effects of socio-
demographic factors on vote choice in the 2011 Saskatche-
wan election; these include standard measures of socioeco-
nomic status (employment status, income level, educational 
attainment), region of residence, religious background, age, 
gender, union membership, and public versus private sector 
employment.12  
To assess how these various factors – issues, leadership 
evaluations, partisan and ideological identities, and socio-
demographic characteristics – influenced vote choice, we 
included them in our model (see appendix A for the logit 
estimates, and appendix B for variable coding). To ease 
interpretation, the binary logit estimates were converted to 
predicted probabilities: the impact of each variable is as-
sessed by calculating the difference in the predicted proba-
bility of voting for the Saskatchewan Party when that varia-
ble is set at low and high values, holding all other variables 
in the model constant at their means. Most variables in the 
model are dichotomous, and for these we calculated the 
difference when each variable is set at zero and at one. How-
ever, two sets of variables are continuous: ratings of Brad 
Wall and Dwain Lingenfelter, and the measures for NDP and 
Saskatchewan party identification. To gauge the impact of 
leaders, we calculated the difference when the value for each 
leader rating variable is set at its own mean, and then at the 
mean for the other leader. We used the same technique to 
assess the impact of party identification. A positive number 
indicates that as the variable approaches its higher value, the 
probability of voting for the Saskatchewan Party increases, 
and a negative number indicates that as the variable ap-
proaches its higher value, the probability of voting for the 
NDP increases. 
As it turns out, despite the welter of possible explana-
tions the election outcome essentially boiled down to three 
factors: issues, party identification, and leader evaluations. 
As Figure 1 shows, our analysis finds that the overwhelming-
ly positive impression that most voters have of Brad Wall 
was clearly the most important factor in the Saskatchewan 
Party’s re-election. Our analysis suggests that Wall’s ratings 
advantage over Lingenfelter increased the probability of a 
Saskatchewan Party vote by 51 points, all other factors being 
equal. Evaluations of Dwain Lingenfelter also had substan-
tial, albeit more modest, impact on the vote choice: our 
estimates indicate the NDP lost one in five votes to the Sas-
katchewan Party because of his relatively lower leadership 
ratings. Simply put, the large number of voters who liked 
Brad Wall gave a considerable boost to the Saskatchewan 
Party’s electoral fortunes whereas the very small number of 
voters who liked Dwain Lingenfelter did little to improve the 
party’s showing.   
Vote choice in the 2011 Saskatchewan Election was also 
shaped by voters’ assessments of which party was closest to 
them on the most important issue in the election. Voters who 
indicated the NDP was the party “closest” to them on their 
most important issue were an estimated 29 points more 
likely to vote NDP than were those who indicated neither the 
NDP nor the Saskatchewan Party were closest to them on an 
issue. A Saskatchewan Party issue preference mattered less 
to voters: those who indicated the Saskatchewan Party was 
closest to them on the most important issue were only seven 
points more likely to vote for the Saskatchewan Party than 
were voters who indicated neither of the two major parties 
were closest to them on an issue.   
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Figure 1: Factors Affecting the Probability of Voting for the 




Thus, the NDP’s ‘issue-based’ campaign resonated with its 
voters while the Saskatchewan Party depended more on the 
personal popularity of Brad Wall.  However, as many voters 
believed that the Saskatchewan Party, rather than the NDP, 
was closest to them when it came to important issues, the 
problem for the NDP was not the absence of issue voting, but 
the failure to convince enough voters that they were best 
able to handle the issues that were most important to them.  
A similar dynamic emerges when it comes to the last sig-
nificant determinant of the vote choice, party identification. 
Once again, it is important to keep in mind that whereas the 
Saskatchewan Party was able to count on a large contingent 
of intense partisans, strong NDP identifiers were relatively 
few and far between. The estimates show that the NDP lost 
about 15 points in support to the Saskatchewan Party be-
cause of this disadvantage in party identification. By way of 
contrast, Saskatchewan Party voting was only four points 
higher than it would have been if Saskatchewan Party identi-
fication was at the same level on average as that of NDP 
identification.  In short, loyal NDP supporters were critical 
to the NDP vote, whereas Saskatchewan Party identification 
was less essential to the Saskatchewan Party vote. It appears 
that the NDP’s campaign did a relatively good job of motivat-
ing its base, but that base was comparatively smaller than 
that of the Saskatchewan Party. Given their disadvantage, 
the NDP’s challenge was to win the lion’s share of votes 
among those who did not identify with their party (roughly 
one-quarter of the electorate) – something the party was 
unable to do.  
It is interesting to note that left-right ideological self-
placement did not emerge as significant predictor of vote 
choice. While voters who identified with the right and the 
center were more likely to vote for the Saskatchewan Party 
and those who identified themselves as being on the left 
were more likely to have voted for NDP,13 when ideological 
self-placement is placed in the full model, its impact is 
washed away by more powerful predictors of vote choice 
namely leadership, issues, and partisan identification.  
A number of other factors were taken into account in the 
model that did not emerge as statistically significant deter-
minants of vote choice. These merit further discussion be-
cause in some instances the apparent insignificance of a 
factor can be slightly deceptive.  The estimation procedure 
used above allows us to discern the direct independent effects 
of each variable on vote choice, but it cannot capture their 
indirect effects – that is, those mediated by other variables 
that are temporally closer to the vote choice. Although a 
detailed analysis of these complex causal chains is beyond 
the scope of this paper, the relevant point is that even if 
these factors do not ultimately account for vote choices they 
can still play a role in shaping voters’ decisions. For instance, 
even though voters’ economic perceptions and their posi-
tions on issues surrounding resource royalties did not have 
any statistically significant direct effects on vote choice, 
there is some evidence to suggest that both economic per-
ceptions and positions on resource royalties determined 
which party voters felt was closest to them on their most 
important issue. The economy and salient issues also affect-
ed evaluations of the party leaders. When voters’ assess-
ments of party leaders and which parties are closest to them 
on the issues are excluded from the model of vote choice, 
both economic perceptions and positions on resource royalty 
issues emerge as significant predictors of the vote. Having a 
positive evaluation of the economy increased the probability 
of voting for the Saskatchewan Party by 11 points while 
favouring higher resource royalties boosted the probability 
of voting NDP by 16 points.14  
Socio-demographic differences in party support had a 
modest impact on the election outcome. Income differences 
are the only socio-demographic factor to emerge as a predic-
tor of vote choice at a conventionally acceptable level of 
statistical significance (i.e., p < .05). Specifically, Saskatche-
wan Party support was five points higher among voters in 
the high-income category than among voters in the middle-
income category. We are less certain (p < .10) about the 
effects of three other factors: our estimates suggest Sas-
katchewan Party support was five points higher among 
women compared to men, seven points lower among resi-
dents of Regina compared to residents of rural Saskatche-
wan, and six points lower among voters aged 55 years and 
older compared to those between 35 and 54 years. Other 
socio-demographic factors had no discernible effects, reflect-
ing an electorate that is not deeply divided along the lines of 




The November 2011 provincial election presented the in-
cumbent Saskatchewan Party with a golden opportunity to 
consolidate its hold on power in Saskatchewan. Entering the 
election the party had many things working in its favour: a 
buoyant economy, a popular leader, and a scandal-free, 
‘middle of the road’ government. The party worked before 
the election to strengthen in the public’s mind the link be-
tween economic success and Brad Wall’s leadership, and the 
evidence suggests those efforts paid off.  By the end of the 
election, the Saskatchewan Party had developed a strong 
base of 42% of the electorate that identified with party and 
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its message of continuing to move Saskatchewan ‘forward’ 
and its optimism about a ‘New Saskatchewan.’16  
The challenge facing the NDP was to distinguish itself 
from the Saskatchewan Party and shift voters’ attention 
away from leadership considerations and on to other issues. 
The NDP attempted to do this with pledges to increase natu-
ral resource revenues, negotiate a natural resource revenue-
sharing agreement with First Nations, build more affordable 
housing, and invest in a variety of other new social pro-
grams.  Given the unpopularity of their leader and the strong 
economic growth in Saskatchewan over the previous four 
years, it was a reasonable strategy for the NDP to run a cam-
paign based on issues where it felt it had an advantage.  
However, the issues on which the NDP enjoyed an advantage 
over the Saskatchewan Party were important only to the 
NDP’s small base of partisan loyalists.  A large majority of 
voters were dissatisfied with the NDP’s leader and uninter-
ested in the issues that the party decided to stress during the 
campaign. As a result, it was unable to attract the large 
number of unaligned voters or make inroads with Saskatch-
ewan Party loyalists to make the election more competitive.     
Heading towards the future, the Saskatchewan Party is 
exceptionally well-placed.  It has a very popular leader, a 
strong base of loyal voters, support across all socio-
demographic groups, and the general confidence of the 
electorate on the issues that it holds to be the most im-
portant.  Nonetheless, no political party is invulnerable. The 
Saskatchewan Party is leader-centered and it is possible that 
Brad Wall could leave the party or that his reputation could 
be tarnished in some way. Much depends on him. Moreover, 
the party has tied its fortunes to the province’s continued 
economic growth and Saskatchewan has a notoriously un-
stable boom and bust economy based on agriculture and 
natural resources. Finally, the party could experience inter-
nal strains: the centrism of the Wall government could strain 
the Saskatchewan Party’s liberal-conservative coalition and a 
third party could arise; alternatively, the large electoral 
majority could embolden the party’s right wing and lead to 
policies that alienate its more centrist voters. If the Sas-
katchewan Party is to have long-term success, it must find 
ways to renew its leadership while in power and maintain a 
‘big tent’ party that represents a consensus-type politics 
focused on delivering optimal policy outcomes on valence 
issues.   
The Saskatchewan NDP is in a difficult position.  It has 
recently gone through a divisive leadership race where a 
moderate, Cam Broten, was elected leader by only 44 votes 
out of 8,284 total votes over Ryan Meili, who represented 
the party’s left-wing.  It has small number of MLAs with few 
resources to oppose the government in the Legislative As-
sembly or engage with the broader public. It is facing a very 
popular Premier, a well-financed Saskatchewan Party politi-
cal machine, and a government whose centrism does not 
produce many controversies. Additionally, the NDP has lost 
the confidence of the public on the most salient issues in the 
province and has the appearance of a party that is adrift.  
Despite the difficult situation in which it finds itself, the 
NDP has three distinct advantages in its rebuilding process. 
The first is that no other opposition party has a presence in 
the legislature or an active extra-parliamentary organization.  
Despite receiving its lowest popular vote since 1938, the 
NDP still emerged from the election as the official opposition 
and the default ‘government in waiting.’ The second ad-
vantage is that the NDP still has a loyal base of roughly one-
fifth of the electorate that has stayed with the party despite 
its difficulties. Third, being first elected in 2007, Broten has 
the advantage being only 35 years old but having over six 
years of experience in the Legislature and none of the bag-
gage that comes with being part of former NDP govern-
ments. As a ‘fresh face’ for the NDP, Broten needs to re-build 
the image of the party and cultivate a new generation of 
leaders to restore the party’s political marketing prowess and 
party organization. Further, the NDP must have a serious 
debate about developing new policy that will resonate out-
side of its traditional base of party loyalists and gain the 
confidence of the electorate on the issues it perceives to be 
most important. 
As mentioned above, recent academic literature on Sas-
katchewan politics has been fascinated with the extent to 
which the province’s partisan politics has converged around 
the political center. The 2011 election provides evidence that 
both supports and contradicts the assertion that left-right 
polarization is alive and well in Saskatchewan party politics. 
During the election campaign, the NDP ran on a substantial-
ly left-wing platform stressing taxing corporations to pay for 
expansive social programs while the Saskatchewan Party ran 
on the relatively right-wing idea of limiting government 
spending in the name of tax cuts and deficit reduction.  
Moreover, the Saskatchewan Election Study illustrates that 
NDP supporters were concerned with a wide range of social 
issues and Saskatchewan Party supporters were more nar-
rowly focused on the economy, deficits, and health care.  
On the other hand, the fact that the Saskatchewan Party 
was able to win 64% of the popular vote suggests that there 
has been a convergence of public opinion around its centre-
right vision for the province. Indeed, the NDP’s attempt to 
divide of the electorate along stark left-right lines by running 
on a platform that resembled 1970s-style traditional social 
democracy was unable to attract substantial number of 
voters outside of the party’s base. The NDP’s appeals to 
positional issues like rent control, resource revenue sharing 
with First Nations, and increasing natural resources royal-
ties had little traction with non-aligned voters. The success 
of the Saskatchewan Party and its dominance on the valence 
issues that were important to voters give credence to Rayner 
and Beaudry-Mellor’s argument that Saskatchewan politics 
has converged “around consumer behaviours whereby citi-
zens engage in politics and political decision making on an 
election-by-election basis guided by their assessment of the 
political party best able to deliver the most desirable package 
of goods” (2009, 25).  If this is the case, the 2011 election 
illustrates how adept the Saskatchewan Party has become at 
a politics centered on leaders who cultivate a strong partisan 
base and concentrate on the valence issues that are great 
importance large numbers of voters.  If the NDP wants to 
make Saskatchewan’s two party system more competitive, it 
must move beyond representing a small minority of voters 
dedicated to a more traditional form of social democracy.  
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Indeed, the NDP needs to compete fully with the Saskatche-
wan Party when it comes to strong leadership, top of mind 




Anderson, Cameron D. 2010. “Economic Voting in Canada: As-
sessing the Effects of Subjective Perceptions and Electoral Con-
text.” In Voting Behaviour in Canada, eds. Cameron D. Ander-
son and Laura B. Stephenson. Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press.  
Bean, Clive and Anthony Mughan. 1989. “Leadership Effects in 
Parliamentary Elections in Australia and Britain.” American Po-
litical Science Review 83: 1165-79. 
Béland, Daniel. November 2011. “Politics and Policy in Brad Wall’s 
Saskatchewan.” Policy Options 32, no. 10: 34-37.   
Bélanger, Éric and Laura B. Stephenson. 2010. “Parties and Parti-
sans: The Influence of Ideology and Brokerage on the Durability 
of Partisanship in Canada.” In Voting Behaviour in Canada, 
eds. Cameron D. Anderson and Laura B. Stephenson. Vancou-
ver: University of British Columbia Press. 
Benjoe, Kerry. 2011. “Interest groups keen on election.” Saskatoon 
Star-Phoenix. October 19, A4. 
Berelson, Bernard, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee. 
1954. Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential 
Campaign. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Blais, Andre, Elisabeth Gidengil, Richard Nadeau, and Neil Nevitte.  
2002.  Anatomy of a Liberal Victory: Making Sense of the Vote 
in the 2000 Canadian Election.  Peterborough, ON: Broadview. 
Blais, Andre and Andrea Perrella. 2008. “Systematic Effects of 
Televised Candidates’ Debates.” International Journal of 
Press/Politics 13: 451-464.  
Blake, Raymond. 2008.  “The Saskatchewan Party and the Politics of 
Branding.”  In Saskatchewan Politics:  Crowding the Centre, 
eds. Howard Leeson.  Regina:  Canadian Plains Research Center.  
Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald 
E. Stokes.  1960.  The American Voter.  New York: Wiley. 
Chabun, Will. 2011. “Sask. Party MLA apologizes for remark.” Sas-
katoon Star-Phoenix. October 22, A1. 
Clarke, Harold D., Allan Kornberg, and Thomas J. Scotto. 2009. 
Making Political Choices: Canada and the United States. To-
ronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Cooper, Cam. 2011.“A ‘perfect storm’ destroyed the NDP”. Regina 
Leader-Post. November 8, A6. 
Couture, Joe and Angela Hall. 2011. “Lingenfelter adds calculator 
feature.” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix. November 2, A4. 
Cowan, Pamela. 2011. “Sask. Party focuses campaign on bottom 
line.” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix. October 17, A5. 
Dalton, Russell J. 2010. “Ideology, Partisanship, and Democratic 
Development.” In Comparing Democracies 3: Elections and 
Voting in the 21st Century, eds. Lawrence LeDuc, Ricahrd G. 
Niemi, and Pippa Norris. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Doyle, Bill. 2011. “Tax, royalty rates boost growth.” Saskatoon Star-
Phoenix. October 28. A12. 
Forum Research. 2011. “News Release: Saskatchewan Party heading 
towards strong majority”, October 27. 
Fong, Petti. 2011. “Wall is seen winning re-election in Saskatche-
wan.” Toronto Star. November 6. A10  
 Fournier, P, A. Blais, R. Nadeau, E. Gidengil, and N. Nevitte. 2003. 
“Issue importance and performance voting.” Political Behavior 
25 (1): 51–67. 
Fuchs, Dieter and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 1989. “The Left-Right 
Schema.” In Continuities in Political Action, eds. M. Kent Jen-
nings and Jan can Deth. Berlin: de Gruyter. 
Gidengil, Elisabeth, Neil Nevitte, André Blais, Joanna Everitt, and 
Patrick Fournier. 2012. Dominance & Decline: Making Sense of 
Recent Canadian Elections. Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press. 
Green, Joyce. 2011. “The politics of resource sharing.” Saskatoon 
Star-Phoenix. October 20. A7. 
Hall, Angela. 2011a. “NDP would tackle labour laws.” Saskatoon 
Star-Phoenix. October 22. A1. 
Hall, Angela. 2011b. “Wall urges voters not to sit on hands.” Saska-
toon Star-Phoenix.  November 1. A1. 
Hall, Angela. 2011c. “Lingenfelter promises help for low-income 
earners.” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix. 28 October. A4.  
Hall, Angela and Joe Couture. 2011. “Debate lacks winner: expert; 
Potash adds sparks to otherwise low-key discussion.” Saskatoon 
Star-Phoenix. October 26. A1. 
Hutton, David. 2011a. “Wall, Lingenfelter ready for Saskatchewan 
election; writ to drop Monday”. Saskatoon Star-Phoenix. Octo-
ber 5. A1.  
Hutton, David. 2011b. “NDP pledges resource talks.” Saskatoon 
Star-Phoenix. October 13. A5.  
Hutton, David. 2011c. “Sask. Party would change school year; La-
bour Day move draws complaints.” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix. 
October 28. A3. 
Hutton, David and Jason Warick, 2011. “PotashCorp’s Q3 windfall 
spurs political debate; Plenty at stake for voters”, Saskatoon 
Star-Phoenix. October 28. A1. 
Insightrix Research. 2009. The State of Saskatchewan. Regina: 
Insightrix Research. November 9. 
Insightrix Research. 2011. SaskParty Holds Steady. Regina: Insight-
rix Research. October 27. 
Johnston, Richard, Andre Blais, Henry E. Brady, and Jean Crete.  
1992.  Letting the People Decide: Dynamics of a Canadian Elec-
tion.  Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. 
Krosnick, Jon. 1990. “Government Policy and Citizen Passion: A 
Case Study of Issue Publics in Contemporary America.” Political 
Behaviour 12(1): 59-92. 
Lazarsfeld, Paul F., Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet. 1944. The 
People’s Choice: How the Voter Makes up His Mind in a Presi-
dential Campaign. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Leeson, Howard. 2008.  “The 2007 Saskatchewan Election:  Water-
shed or Way Station?”  In Saskatchewan Politics:  Crowding the 
Centre, eds. Howard Leeson.  Regina:  Canadian Plains Re-
search Center.  
Long, J. Scott and Jeremy Freese. 2006. Regression Models for 
Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata, Second Edition. 
College Station, Texas: Stata Press.   
Lewis-Beck, Michael. 1988. Economics and Elections: The Major 
Western Democracies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Lupia, Arthur and Matthew D. McCubbins.  1998.  The Democratic 
Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know?  New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Mandryk, Murray. 2008. “A budget the NDP should really love.” 
Regina Leader-Post. March 20. D3.  
Mandryk, Murray. 2009. “NDP running into a solid Wall.” Regina 
Leader-Post. November 6. B6.  
10	   Canadian Political Science Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2013, 1-12	  
Mandryk, Murray. 2011a. “NDP platform begins to resemble a 
wholesale shopping spree.” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix. October 
21. A4.  
Mandryk, Murray. 2011b. “Precious time ticks away for NDP’s 
Lingenfelter at debate.” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix. October 26. 
A4. 
McGrane, David. 2008. “The 2007 Provincial Election in Saskatch-
ewan.” Canadian Political Science Review 2, no. 1: 64-71.   
McGrane, David. 2011. “Balancing Conflicting Purposes: Saskatche-
wan Taxation Policy from 1991 to 2011.” In New Directions in 
Saskatchewan Public Policy, ed. David McGrane. Regina: Cana-
dian Plains Research Center Press.   
Mendelsohn, Matthew. 1994. “The Media’s Persuasive Effects: The 
Priming of Leadership in the 1988 General Election.” Canadian 
Journal of Political Science 27: 81-97. 
NDP. 2011. A Plan for Saskatchewan’s Future. 
Newman, Dwight. 2011. “Revenue sharing policy proposal divisive, 
unwise.” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix. October 27. A13. 
Nevitte, Neil, Andre Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil, and Richard Nadeau. 
2000. Unsteady State: The 1997 Canadian Federal Election. 
Toronto: Oxford University Press. 
O’Fee, Kevin. 2008. “Saskatchewan’s Political Party Systems and the 
Development of Third Party Politics” In Saskatchewan Politics:  
Crowding the Centre, eds. Howard Leeson.  Regina:  Canadian 
Plains Research Center.  
Pacholik, Barb and Joe Couture. 2011. “NDP promises infrastructure 
investment.” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix. October 31, A1. 
Praxis Analytics. 2011. Voter Preference and Issues Research: Base 
Report. Regina: Praxis Analytics.  
Rayner, Jeremy and Tina Beaudry-Mellor. 2009. “Hope and Fear 
Revisited: Did the Provincial Election of 2007 Mark the Transi-
tion to a Stable Two-Party System in Saskatchewan?” Canadian 
Political Science Review 3, no. 1: 17-33. 
Saskatchewan Department of Finance. 2010. Public Accounts, 2009-
2010, Volume 1. Regina: Department of Finance.  
Saskatchewan Party. 2011a. Moving Saskatchewan Forward.  
Saskatchewan Party. 2011b. “News Release: Premier Wraps Up 
Week Three of Campaign in Saskatoon.” October 29.  
Siaroff, Alan. 2009. “Research Note: Seat Imbalance in Provincial 
Elections Since 1900: A Quantitative Explanation.” Canadian 
Political Science Review 3, no. 1:  77-92.  
Stokes, Donald E. 1963. “Spatial Models of Party Competition.” 
American Political Science Review 57: 368-77. 
Warick, Jason. 2011a. “Chiefs to form political party; Revenue 
sharing a concern.” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix. November 4. A1. 
Warick, Jason. 2011b. “Chow roasts Wall, Doyle.” Saskatoon Star-
Phoenix. November 4. A4. 
Warick, Jason and Janet French. 2011. “NDP promises affordable 
housing; 2,500 units would be built in term” Saskatoon Star-
Phoenix. October 29. A3. 
Wesley, Jared. 2011. Code Politics: Campaigns and Cultures on the 
Canadian Prairies. Vancouver: UBC Press.  
Wishlow, Kevin. 2001. “Rethinking the Polarization Thesis: The 
Formation and Growth of the Saskatchewan Party, 1997-2001.” 
In Saskatchewan Politics: Into the Twenty-First Century, eds. 
Howard Leeson. Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre. 
Wood, James. 2009. “Premier defends lower targets.” Regina Lead-
er-Post. April 24. A7. 
 
 
Appendix A: Binary Logit Estimates of Saskatchewan Party 




 Canadian Political Science Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2013, 1-12 11 
	  
	  





1  A survey for academic purposes was conducted during the final 
week of the 2003 Saskatchewan provincial election campaign. 
However, the survey did not concentrate on explaining the out-
come of the election. Rather, it focused on how voters assign 
responsibility for policy outcomes between the federal and pro-
vincial levels of government in Canada. See Fred Cutler, “Who-
dunnit? Voters and Responsibilty in Canadian Federalism”, Ca-
nadian Journal of Political Science 41, no. 3: 627-654.  
2  One exception to this was the government’s attempt to allow 
marriage commissioners to opt out of marrying gays and les-
bians, a proposal that was rejected by the courts. 
3  Environics was the only firm to produce public polling on party 
support in Saskatchewan from November 2007 to November 
2009. However, due to the sample size for Saskatchewan (n = 
126), these polls only be used as broad indicators of party sup-
port. 
4  From 2008-2011, the Saskatchewan Party raised $12.3 million 
compared to the NDP’s $5.5 million. Approximately half of the 
Saskatchewan Party’s donations came from business while the 
rest came from individuals. For the NDP, 8% of their donations 
came from business, 10% came from unions, and the remainder 
came from individuals. See Elections Saskatchewan, Registered 
Political Party's Fiscal Period Return (E-521), 2008-2011. 
5  Forum Research released two polls (one in late October and one 
the weekend before the election).  Insightrix and Praxis both re-
leased polls in late October.  polls in late October.   
6  The SKES was funded by the Johnson Shoyama Graduate 
School of Public Policy, with additional support from LEAD Sas-
katoon, St. Thomas More College, and the University of Saskat-
chewan College of Arts and Science. The survey was administe-
red by the University of Saskatchewan Social Sciences Research 
Laboratories’ survey lab. Results of the survey, which generated 
a response rate of 23.6%, are generalizable to the Saskatchewan 
population (18 years of age and older) + 2.95% at the 95% confi-
dence interval (19 times out of 20).  Data are weighted according 
to age, gender, and region of residence. 
7  When asked, “In your opinion, should natural resource royalties 
be increased, decreased, or kept about the same as now,” the 
majority indicated royalties ought to be kept the same as now 
(56 percent). Further, when asked to rate their agreement with 
the statement “Aboriginal people should receive their own sepa-
rate share of Saskatchewan's natural resource royalties,” most 
respondents somewhat (22 percent) or strongly (52 percent) di-
sagreed with the idea.   
8  When asked, “over the past year, has the Saskatchewan econo-
my gotten better, gotten worse, or stayed about the same,” the 
majority of respondents (57 percent) believed the economy had 
improved in 2011, and when asked “financially, are you better 
off, worse off, or about the same as a year ago?”, most respon-
dents believed their personal situation had either stayed the 
same (60 percent) or improved (26 percent). 
9  Unfortunately, there were no academic surveys of the Saskat-
chewan provincial elections of 1999 and 2007 which the Saskat-
chewan Party contested.  The survey data from the 2003 provin-
cial election was gathered by Fred Cutler for an article on voters’ 
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sense of federal and provincial responsibility in the area of 
health care. See Fred Culter. 2008. “Whodunnit? Canadian Vo-
ters, Intergovernmentalism, and Responsibility”, Canadian 
Journal of Political Science 41, no. 3: 627-654 
10  In the SKES data, when the intensity of partisan attachment in 
Saskatchewan was measured by the simple question of ‘How 
strongly do you think of your as Saskatchewan Par-
ty/NDP/Liberal supporter’, 65% of Saskatchewan Party parti-
sans answered ‘very close’ or ‘somewhat close.’ The same num-
ber for NDP partisans was 75% and 50% for Liberal partisans. 
11  A respondent who answered 0 to 4 to the question “In politics, 
people sometimes talk of left and right.  Where would you place 
yourself on a scale from ‘0’ to ‘10’, where ‘0’ means you are ‘Very 
Left’ and ‘10’ means you are ‘Very Right’?”  is considered to 
place themselves on the ‘left’ whereas a respondent who answe-
red 6 to 10 is considered to place themselves on the ‘right.’  A 
centrist answered 5 to this question. 
12  Unfortunately, the SKES did not contain enough First Nations 
and Métis respondents to permit reliable inferences about Abo-
riginal voting behaviour. 
	  
	  
13  According to the SKES, 69 percent of voters who identified as 
being the left voted for the NDP while 61 percent of voters who 
identified as being centrist and 87 percent of voters who identi-
fied as right voted for the Saskatchewan Party. Note the res-
ponses of ‘refused’ and ‘I don’t know’ (approximately 13% of all 
voters) have been removed from these percentages. For defini-
tions of left, right, and center see footnote 11. 
14  The detailed results are available upon request. 
15  For descriptive statistics on the voting patterns of various socio-
demographic groups see Michael Atkinson, Loleen Berdahl, Da-
vid McGrane, and Stephen White. 2011.  Profile of party sup-
porters in the 2011 Saskatchewan provincial election: A 
research brief. Saskatoon: Johnson-Shoyama Graduate School 
of Public Policy. 
16  For a discussion of the concept of a ‘New Saskatchewan’ see 
David McGrane. 2012. “Introduction: Public Policy in the New 
Saskatchewan.” In New Directions in Saskatchewan Public Pol-
icy, ed. David McGrane. Regina: Canadian Plains Research Cen-
ter Press and Simon Enoch. Spring/Fall 2011. “The ‘New Sas-
katchewan’ Neoliberal Renewal or Redux?”, Socialist Studies 7, 
no. 1/2, 191-215.    
 
	  
